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high-value Natural resources:
a BlessiNg or a curse for Peace?
by Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad*
InTroducTIon 
High-value natural resources have the potential to promote and consolidate peace. Too often, however, they make the path to sustainable peace long and haz-
ardous. Valuable resources can help to jump-start development, 
secure sustainable growth, raise living standards, and increase 
economic equality. 1 They are also an important source of for-
eign currency for cash-strapped governments, can reduce depen-
dence on international aid, and can support compensation and 
post-conflict relief for war-affected populations.2 But the prom-
ise of a brighter and more peaceful future is often spoiled by 
deep-rooted corruption and patronage, which confer benefits on 
small groups rather than on the population as a whole, and by 
shortsighted management of the resources and the revenues they 
generate.3 In addition, the mere presence of high-value resources 
can jeopardize peace if the resources become the focus of vio-
lent disputes or provide financing for groups that seek to ignite 
(or resume) armed conflict.
In many post-conflict countries, revenues from high-value 
natural resources— such as oil, natural gas, minerals, gemstones, 
and timber—are an integral (and even dominant) part of the 
national economy and state budget.4 In post-conflict Algeria, 
Angola, and Sudan, for example, oil and gas account for more 
than sixty percent of government revenues and over ninety percent 
of all export revenues.5 See Figure 1. In Sierra Leone, following 
a brutal civil war that ended in 2002, when diamonds accounted 
for ninety-six percent of all exports.6 And in Chad, Iraq, Libya, 
and Nigeria—all of which were affected by armed conflict during 
the early years of the twenty-first century—oil and gas account for 
as much as seventy percent of gross domestic product and more 
than eighty percent of government revenues.7 In Niger, uranium 
and gold are important revenue sources,8 as are oil, cocoa, and 
coffee in Côte d’Ivoire,9 and diamonds and timber in the Central 
African Republic.10 In Burma, gas exports made up one-quarter 
of all exports, while forest products and gemstones were other 
important exports between 2008 and 2010.11
When peace comes, the revenues from high-value natural 
resources—when managed well—can help finance reconstruc-
tion and other vital peace-related needs.13 When mismanaged, 
however, resource revenues can undermine both economic per-
formance and the quality of governance, and thereby increase 
the risk of renewed violence.14
Recent high-prof ile reports 
by the U.N. Secretary-General, the 
World Bank, the U.N. Environment 
Programme, and the United Nations 
have highlighted the need to more 
effectively harness high-value natural 
resources for development and peace-
building.15 If managed effectively, 
high-value natural resources constitute 
substantial assets that national and 
international actors can use to sup-
port core peace building objectives, 
including macroeconomic recovery, 
generation and support of livelihood, 
the reform of governance and political 
processes, and security improvement.16
The fact that so many resource-
rich countries are unable to achieve 
long-term peace, however, raises some 
difficult questions about how high-
value resources should be managed 
in post-conflict settings. For example, 
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Figure 1. The Economic Role of the Extractive Sector in Selected 
Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Countries12
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how can the environmental effects of resource extraction be 
minimized? How can illegal extraction be curtailed without 
damaging livelihoods? How can one ensure that revenues are 
used to advance long-term development objectives? The goal 
of our analysis here is to provide insight into these and similar 
questions — for the benefit of national and local governments, 
national and transnational civil society organizations, extractive 
industries, and the international community. To this end, policy 
makers, field researchers, practitioners, and scholars—all of 
whom have close knowledge of the issues at hand—have been 
asked to share their views on the challenges associated with 
the management of high-value resources in post-conflict and 
conflict-affected countries.
From PoTenTIal ProsPerITy To conFlIcT:  
WhaT goes Wrong?
High-value natural resources have been associated with 
dozens of armed conflicts, millions of deaths, and the collapse 
of several peace processes; case study and statistical evidence 
confirms that such resources play a role in sparking and fuel-
ing armed civil conflict.17 According to 
data gathered by Siri Aas Rustad and Helga 
Malmin Binningsbø, between 1970 and 
2008 the portion of armed civil conflicts 
that were in some way related to high-value 
natural resources ranged from twenty-nine 
to fifty-seven percent.18 See Figure 2.
Why is peace so difficult to achieve 
and sustain in the presence of these 
resources?19 High-value natural resources 
increase the risk of conflict in a number of 
ways. The risk of conflict can be directly 
increased when access to revenues moti-
vates or finances belligerent movements, or 
when grievances are created (1) by unmet 
expectations or inequalities in the distribu-
tion of revenues, jobs, and other benefits, or 
(2) by the negative side effects of resource 
exploitation.20 The risk of conflict can be 
indirectly increased when resource sectors 
undermine a nation’s economic perfor-
mance and the quality of its institutions.21 
Thus, the three main avenues that lead 
from natural resources to armed conflict 
are resource capture, resource related grievances, and adverse 
effects on the economy and institutions.22
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Päivi Lujala suggest that 
the capture of resources for personal or regional enrichment is a 
possible motivation for rebel uprisings and violent secessionist 
movements.23 Although resource capture can be one of the goals 
of armed rebellion, it is rarely, if ever, the sole motivation.24 
Even in Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front has 
been represented as the classic example of a predatory, greed-
driven movement, the reality is far more complex.25 More often, 
resource capture is a means of financing warfare and attracting 
supporters.26 For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
“FARC”) has for decades relied on kidnapping and the produc-
tion and selling drugs to finance its insurgency.27 As efforts to 
curtail FARC’s access to income from these activities have met 
with some success, FARC has turned to gold mining to support 
its violent campaign against the government.28
Grievances can motivate armed conflict, particularly when 
the parties to a resource related dispute are divided along 
ethnic, religious, or other lines.29 Among the events that may 
spark violent uprisings are land appropriation, environmental 
degradation, population displacement, large inflows of migrants, 
and frustration over unfulfilled economic expectations.30 Exam-
ples of grievance-based conflicts include Aceh, in Indonesia; 
Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea; Kurdistan, in Iraq; northern 
Niger; and southern Sudan.31 Grievances do not necessarily arise 
in the context of potential regional autonomy, as was the case in 
Aceh and South Sudan.32 They may also occur in response to the 
abuse of power by local elites, as was the case in Sierra Leone.33
With respect to economic growth and developmental out-
comes, many resource-rich countries perform poorly in compari-
son to their less resource-rich counterparts.35 This phenomenon, 
often referred to as the resource curse or the paradox of plenty,36 
is exemplified in countries such as Algeria, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Nigeria.37 The resource curse 
has a number of potential causes, including the following:
•	 A government that is able to finance its budget through nat-
ural resource revenues rather than public taxation can easily 
become detached from, and therefore less accountable to, 
the populace.38
Figure 2. Armed Civil Conflicts Involving High-value Natural Resources, 1970 
–200834
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•	 Resource revenues often fuel patronage, corruption, and 
rent seeking, all of which may promote the interests of a 
small and predatory elite.39 In Nigeria, for example, it is 
estimated that one percent of the population enjoys eighty 
percent of the oil revenues.40
•	 When the group in power focuses on short-term gains 
(sometimes in an effort to meet popular demands), the 
results may include overspending, poor investment deci-
sions, and ill-conceived economic policies.41
•	 In countries whose economies depend on a few valuable 
resources, the weakness of political and economic institu-
tions may be compounded by exposure to price shocks, 
which occur when rapid shifts in raw material prices lead to 
abrupt fluctuations in resource revenues.42
Political and economic underperformance is endemic in 
many resource-rich countries—which, according to empirical 
studies, renders them vulnerable 
to conflict.43 Several studies have 
documented that armed civil 
conflict is more likely to occur in 
poor countries than in rich ones.44 
Research also shows that dysfunc-
tional institutions and low state 
capacity are positively correlated 
with an increased likelihood of 
conflict.45
Supporting the case study 
evidence, several statistical studies 
document strong and signifi-
cant relationships between par-
ticular natural resources and 
conflict, but few have been able to 
disentangle the possible mecha-
nisms behind the relationships.46 
James Fearon and David Laitin, 
for example, have found that oil 
increases the likelihood of conflict—a finding that has been 
confirmed by the work of Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer, 
Macartan Humphreys, and Päivi Lujala.47 Lujala has also found 
that when oil and gas are located in the conflict area, conflicts 
tend to be longer and more severe.48 Taken together, Lujala shows 
that (1) oil-producing countries are 1.5 to 2 times more likely to 
experience armed civil conflict than nonproducers, and that (2) 
when internal conflict occurs in a region that has oil reserves, 
it lasts twice as long as conflicts that occur in areas without oil 
reserves, and combatant deaths are twice as high.49 Collier and 
Hoeffler’s 2006 study of conflict types links oil to higher risk of 
secessionist conflict, and Lujala shows that secessionist conflicts 
in regions with oil reserves tend to be more severe than any other 
conflicts.50
Diamonds and other gemstones have also been subject 
to statistical studies.51 Fearon and Lujala have shown that gem-
stones have effects similar to those of oil—namely, conflict is 
more likely and tends to last longer.52 The role of timber, opium, 
and other high-value crops is less clear.53 There is some evidence 
that opium cultivation makes conflicts last longer, but little 
systematic evidence links timber production to civil war.54
resources For conFlIcT
Because natural resources have varying characteristics, they 
are not equally relevant to conflict—and those that are relevant 
may be so for different reasons.55 High-value resources, for 
example, may be either renewable or nonrenewable, although 
most— such as oil, gas, rutile, coltan, cobalt, diamonds, and 
gold—are nonrenewable, and tend to be located in geographi-
cally limited areas.56 What all high-value resources have in com-
mon, however, is the potential to yield substantial revenue.57
Some high-value resources are limited to confined areas 
and depend on sophisticated and expensive extraction methods 
or require special types of transportation (e.g., pipelines).58 
Because such resources are difficult to loot and are generally 
securely controlled by the govern-
ment during periods of both peace 
and war, they provide fewer oppor-
tunities for conflict financing.59 
Thus, the revenues from resources 
such as oil, natural gas, kimberlite 
diamonds, copper, and rutile are 
likely to accrue to the central gov-
ernment and those who control it.60 
Such resources may nevertheless 
play a role in conflict: rebel move-
ments may seek to oust the govern-
ment to gain control of them, and 
if the resources are located in more 
remote areas, they may play a role 
in secessionist uprisings.61 Rebels 
may also loot existing stockpiles 
of commodities or may attempt to 
bring extraction or transportation 
to a halt, in order to cut off the 
central government from its revenue source.62 Finally, the large 
revenues derived from high-value resources may increase the 
risk of conflict through adverse effects on political and economic 
institutions.63
Some high-value resources are linked to conflict because 
of their financing potential.64 However deep grievances may be, 
rebellion is unlikely to begin or to be sustained without financ-
ing opportunities.65 Since the end of the Cold War, financing 
from the superpowers has declined and revenues from valuable 
natural resources have gained importance as a source of conflict 
financing.66 The resources most suitable for wartime looting 
have extremely high value-to-weight ratio and can be easily 
extracted, concealed, smuggled, and sold.67 Easy extraction is a 
particular advantage: a resource that can be extracted by indi-
viduals or small groups using simple tools (that is, through arti-
sanal mining techniques) can be readily exploited by rebels who 
either undertake the mining themselves or use forced labor.68 
Among the commodities with high price-to-weight ratios that 
can be artisanally mined are alluvial gold, alluvial diamonds, and 
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gemstones such as rubies and sapphires.69 Rebels do not need to 
rely on extraction directly; they also engage in illegal taxation 
of trade and export routes.70 In some cases, including Colombia 
and Nigeria, rebels have succeeded in obtaining ransoms from 
extractive firms by threatening to blow up oil pipelines or by 
kidnapping personnel working on installations.71
When it comes to conflict financing, many natural resources 
have another advantage: they are generic, which means that their 
origins cannot be traced as easily as those of manufactured prod-
ucts.72 Because generic illegal commodities can be readily inte-
grated into legal trade channels, they are a particularly lucrative 
form of contraband, with trade prices that differ only marginally 
from those of their legal counterparts.73 Another advantage of 
some high-value resources is their scarcity.74 Some occur in only 
a small number of countries and have few substitutes, and are, 
therefore, of strategic importance.75 Demand for such resources 
may sometimes override other considerations, such as the legal-
ity of the exploitation, the behavior of the government that has 
granted exploitation rights, and the role of the commodities in 
financing warfare.76
Of course, resources other than high-value minerals may 
play a role in conflict or have adverse effects on economic 
and political institutions.77 Most notable are coca and opium, 
which have been linked to conflicts in Latin America and Asia, 
respectively, and timber, which has been connected to a number 
of conflicts in Africa and Southeast Asia.78 Fisheries have also 
been used to finance conflict; in Somalia, for example, some 
warring groups have sold false fishing licenses for offshore tuna 
reserves.79
conclusIon
When conflict ends, many of the original causes often 
remain unresolved—whether they relate to resources or not—
and may even have been aggravated by the grievances and eco-
nomic and political havoc associated with the conflict itself.80 
Post-conflict countries thus face daunting challenges when it 
comes to building peace, reducing poverty, and managing natural 
resources—particularly when poor resource management may 
be undermining both peacebuilding and poverty reduction.81 
It is clear that many resource-rich post-conflict countries are 
unable to sustain peace.82 This observation has been confirmed 
by empirical studies: for example, Rustad and Binningsbø’s 
analysis of 285 episodes of armed civil conflict shows that when 
natural resources play a role, the period of post-conflict peace is 
forty percent shorter than when they do not.83
The difficulty of sustaining peace when high-value natural 
resources are involved has two key implications: (1) the conflicts 
involving such resources are generally harder to resolve; and (2) 
thus far, the measures that have been used to manage natural 
resources and their associated revenues are generally unsatis-
factory.84 Thus, improved management of high-value natural 
resources and the associated revenues is fundamental to peace 
building.
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